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发表于 2005-12-31 17:03:02
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[转帖]nature上最新的系统生物学文章
这篇是cell上的
1174 Cell 123, December 29, 2005 ©2005 Elsevier Inc.
a given problem more holistically. Most
visionaries of the past are forgotten
because their grand ideas and books
became useless once the pedestrian
way of experimental science revealed
their incompatibilities with the facts of
nature. Science remains the art of the
solvable. Traveling the systems road,
we must constantly ask ourselves how
appropriate the big picture is and how
adequate the systems approach is to
the level of the question we are trying to
answer. The fundamentally new characteristic
of systems biology is its way
of thinking, rather than its way of doing.
Systems thinking realizes that the phenotype
of a system (from the shape of
a cell to an evolutionary stable strategy)
is the emergent property of the interactions
among all of the components
of this system. Thus, it is neither the
scale of the system nor the particular
approach used to arrive at a list of its
functional components that defines a
systems approach. In fact, perhaps
paradoxically, for research driven by
this concept to succeed, it may be
necessary first to isolate a reduced
system to provide an experimentally
testable hypothesis. For example, to
understand the molecular changes
that occur in a cell upon binding of a
ligand to its receptor, most quantitative
biologists largely query well-defined in
vitro cell culture systems, which do not
necessarily reflect the in vivo responses
of a complex developing system. Thus,
for the time being, the practical (as
opposed to the conceptual) translation
of systems biology is much better
referred to as large-scale reductionism.
A further complication is that every
system can be described at numerous
levels, but only very few of these
are relevant to a useful understanding
of the system. To give an example, the
early universe, a car engine, and a boa
constrictor are all products of quantum
interactions of subatomic particles. Yet
a quantum description of these interactions
is only useful for one of the three
systems: it can neither tell us if the
engine is working nor what the snake
had for lunch. Richard Dawkins refers
to this necessary feature of scientific
inquiry as “hierarchical reductionism”
(Dawkins, 1986). So, although largescale
measurements are imperative
for a comprehensive description of the
system, the level at which both measurements
and integration occur must
vary depending on the system being
studied and the question being asked.
Our third consideration questions
the assumption that if systems biology
is holistic, then genetics is reductionist.
Let us first have a closer look at the
“omics” approach. It is now possible to
measure, with increasing precision and
in some cases in real time, the molecular
constituents of a system and their
variations across a series of dynamic
phenotypic changes. These measurements
are collectively referred to as
“omics” (as in genomics, transcriptomics,
proteomics, lipidomics, and so
on). But not every “omics” experiment
is systems biology. It depends on the
question. If the purpose of a microarray
experiment, for example, is to identify
a few target genes for a transcription
factor and then validate the “most
promising candidates,” then this is not
systems biology. If, on the other hand,
the purpose is to describe the global
transcriptional response of the cell to
changes in the level, localization, or
sequence of the transcription factor
and then ask how the new molecular
conditions created in the cell interact
to produce the phenotype, then that
is systems biology. Thus, the tools put
constraints on the task at hand, but
they do not define it. So, what about
the genetic approach?
We argue that the assumption that
genetics, and especially forward genetics,
is a reductionist approach is simply
erroneous. Like a microarray experiment,
a genetic screen is not itself
reductionist or holistic. It is the use of
the genetic toolbox that defines its outcome.
It seems that, by mistaking the
“omics” wave for the systems approach
itself, we are forgetting some of the
most influential systems approaches
of the past: when Christiane Nusslein-
Volhard and Eric Wieschaus (Nusslein-
Volhard and Wieschaus, 1980) targeted
the whole Drosophila genome
using random mutagenesis to unravel
the riddle of embryonic pattern formation,
they were doing systems biology.
Other classical examples include the
Drosophila screens of Seymour Benzer
(for example Hotta and Benzer,
1972) and the C. elegans screens of
Sydney Brenner (for example, Hodgkin
and Brenner, 1977). How conceptually
different is a genome-wide forward
genetic screen from genome-wide
RNAi screens (reviewed in Friedman
and Perrimon, 2004)? Today, mouse
RNAi screens and proteomics measurements
can only be done in vitro. As
such, is a forward genetic screen for
behavioral defects in the living mouse
not at least as much, if not more, relevant
to systems biology? In general, a
genetic screen addresses the following
questions: what is the total number of
components required to build a given
phenotype (system) and what is the
contribution of each of these components
to the phenotype? To answer
these questions, genetics assumes
(correctly) that perturbation of these
components should result in some
change in the expression of the phenotype.
Furthermore, our ever-increasing
capacity to visualize and quantify
subtle and dynamic phenotypes—from
cell shape to behavior—in live animals
means future genetic screens will provide
an unprecedented wealth of physiologically
relevant information. Genetics
is not only compatible with systems
biology, it is a corner stone of any useful
form of it. But if all it takes to remain
fashionable is a fresh label, “Forward
Genetomics” might do nicely.
References
Dawkins, R. (1986). The Blind Watchmaker, 1st
Edition (New York: Norton & Company).
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Nature 287, 795–801. |
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